Arab Public Debate on the “Deal of the Century” in the “Versailles” Framework by Éva, Ádám












The Trump administration has reportedly planned to publish its self-drafted Middle East 
peace initiative some time during the year 2019, exactly 100 years after the Treaty of 
Versailles (1919) was signed. Although previous and subse uent agreements, 
declarations and treaties, such as the Sykes-Picot Agreement (191 ), the Balfour 
Declaration (191 ), the Treaty of S vres (1920) and the Treaty of  ausanne (192 ) had 
much more to do with the fate of the Middle East than the Treaty of Versailles itself, the 
coincidence of the announcement of the “deal of the century” with the anniversary of 
“Versailles” provides great significance to the latter in current Arab public debate. While 
the above mentioned events and decisions did not meaningfully hinder the long-term 
Israeli–Palestinian peace process, the “deal of the century” might have harmful effects 
for it. Arab leaders as well as opinionmakers of all kinds agree on the existence of a strong 
parallel between the aims and design of the Versailles-related treaties and those of the 
“deal of the century.” They agree that both of them deny the right of self-determination 
to Arab nations and that they are both designed to foreshadow decades of bloody conflicts 
between the nations of the Middle East. The “deal of the century” might also sanctify the 
“ac uisition of land by force” which has clear implications for state-to-state relations. In 
my analysis, I will provide a snapshot of the Arab public debate on the “deal of the 
century” and how it is related to the anniversary of the Treaty of Versailles and related 
agreements.  
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  ersailles  an  t e     es  i ot   ste   
By today, most of the Middle Eastern societies from Morocco to Iran have accepted the 
transformation of the Ottoman empire into the nation-state system that has evolved in the 
early to the mid-1900s. The most general sentiment expressed towards the events of 
World War I and the end of the Ottoman caliphate is 
“nostalgia for the bygone days of a multinational, multireligious, and multiethnic 
Ottoman Empire that, despite its many limitations, offered far more geographical 
fluidity and population mobility than is possible in today’s world of guarded national 
borders.” (Tarazi Fawaz, 201 : 2  ). 
As  eila Tarazi Fawaz explains, although the world wars and the subse uent 
treaties had a long-lasting effect on the thinking of the generations who witnessed the 
events or participated in them, the governments of the newly established Arab states made 
sure to use these sentiments and the related acts of remembrance to reinforce nationalism 
among their peoples. In our era, only a limited number of ideologues and militants believe 
in the actuality of  uestioning the raison d  tre of the so-called “Sykes-Picot system.” The 
voices who argue for “the end of Sykes-Picot” fail to recognize that no Western power 
will, in terms of policy, ever  uestion the legitimacy of the borders drawn at the San Remo 
conference in 1920 (Gause, 201 ). Similarly, Arab states in the Middle East strive to 
uphold the status  uo of their borders which is a guarantee for their perseverance in the 
anarchic international system. As no state would agree on border changes, separatists in 
any part of the Middle East are in effect waging a war against the international system. 
The facts on the ground, however, point in a direction where states and the international 
system are striving to uphold the regional order in the Middle East in vain as minorities 
and non-state actors de  a to started to deconstruct the “Sykes-Picot system”. Sub-regions 
based on historical and ethnic significance are now recognizable political units (Wright, 
201 ). Political scientists have put forward various scenarios involving a review of the 
“Sykes-Picot system”. in response to this However, the most expected scenario remains 
the one based on a permanent state of unrest, in which state and non-state actors do not 
simply disagree on the existing borders but also on the distribution of power among them 
(Mahfoud, 201 ). 
The Middle East is the only region (the sum of the three sub-regions of the 
Maghreb, Gulf and the  evant) in the world which did not succeed in founding an all-




inclusive security mechanism, such as the OSCE, during the 20th century, and, as such, 
the region is still dependent on outside powers who negotiate their peace instead of 
themselves (Jones, 2009: 10 -11 ). Although many Arab leaders strived to be regarded 
at least symbolically as leaders of the “Arab nation” (al  mma  al ara iyya ), i.e., 
leaders of the Middle Eastern Arab population, their rhetoric at best only helped them 
build more robust domestic legitimacy, while they remained short of real trans-regional 
political power. 
As A ami observes: 
“The anticolonialism of the mandate years lent a great deal of unity to the Arab 
system, as an entire generation was traumatized by what they saw as the Arabs’ 
betrayal by the West. The Balfour Declaration and the Sykes Picot agreement made 
their imprint on a large number of Arab nationalists, wherever they were, and forged 
a strong bond of unity among officials, publicists and officers who thought in terms 
of the Arabs and the West.” (A ami, 19  :    ). 
The sentiment of pan-Arabism has been exhausted by the end of the 19 0s which has 
been clearly reflected in the growing sentiments of state nationalism (especially in the 
case of Palestinian nationalism) and pan-Islamism (Ibid.,   0-   ).  
The nationalism pro ects have failed by the advent of the Arab Spring. Islamism, 
both as a nationalist and trans-national pro ect, reemerged at that time to subse uently 
become very soon the ob ect of states-led counter-revolutions in the 2010s (al-Anani, 
2019). The region nowadays still suffers from a lack of the ability of self-determination 
as it stands largely penetrated by regional and world powers. In the post-Arab Spring 
environment, regional politics degraded largely into a set of sub ect-ob ect relations 
between Gulf monarchies and dependent states in which the former try to rigorously apply 
their political doctrine on the latter.  
The “deal of the century” was introduced against this backdrop: a plan designed 
to end more than 100 years of territorial dispute between Arabs and Jews in general, and 
Palestinians and Israelis in particular. At the time of writing this, the proposed “deal” is 
not known in full – although certain details have been revealed or leaked over the course 
of 2019 (see e.g. MEE, 2019). 
Similarly to the principles of the Treaty of Versailles and all the previous and 
subse uent agreements, declarations and treaties, such as the Sykes-Picot Agreement 
(191 ), the Balfour Declaration (191 ), the Treaty of S vres (1920) and the Treaty of 
 ausanne (192 ), the “deal of the century” was designed to determine the fate of Arabs 




based at least in part on American interests, without re uesting real consent of the 
“ob ects” of the deal. Arab opinion-makers generally agree that both “Versailles” and the 
Trump administration’s deal aim to deny the free will of the Arab nations to decide on 
their own fate and that they both prospectively foreshadow decades of bloody conflict 
between the nations of the Middle East.  
The irony behind Donald Trump and Jared Kushner’s plan is that it was similarly 
a US president, Woodrow Wilson, who exactly one-hundred years ago, in 1919, sent a 
fact-finding mission to the  evant in order to design his own deal of the century based on 
the desires of the peoples of the Middle East (Fisk, 2019). The King-Crane Commission 
found that most of the people of the  evant favored an independent Great Syria (including 
the present-day  ebanon, Israel, Palestine and Jordan) governed by the Hashemites with 
US backing, as the latter en oyed general support vis- -vis the French and British who 
had a long history of colonialism behind their backs.2 The Commission’s final opinion 
reflected the above view which was also represented by the unitary opinion of the Syrian 
National Congress, a bold but premature initiative for an independent Syria which was 
abolished in 1920 by the French. 
Unfortunately, the imperial powers of the French and the British persevered in the 
territorial dispute as the US Congress backed out from the Treaty of Versailles after the 
King-Crane Commission finished its mission. With that, the Balfour Declaration became 
the most pertinent principle-setting document (adopted during the San Remo conference 
in 1920) for establishing the long-term future of the  evant. 
After WWII, the UN would become the primary force which legally delineated 
the borders between the prospective Jewish state and Palestine. After the independence 
of the nations of the region, both the US and European states again and again stressed the 
importance of providing the people of Palestine the right of self-determination as per the 
internationally accepted borders of the two states. Whatever the effects of the Balfour 
declaration and the US support behind Israel, the US itself became the main supporter of 
Palestinian independence and regularly consulted Arab leaders on this issue. Despite the 
clear political alliance between the US and Israel, many believed that the US would be 
the principal guarantor of the two-state solution in any circumstances. Trump and 
Kushner’s deal, in its abstract form, has therefore become a new symbol of the ignorance 
of the West,  ust as the time when the imperial powers denied the principle and right of 
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self-determination – before, during and after Versailles. The King-Crane Commission 
thus remains the last collective effort in the last one-hundred years that aimed at creating 
a regional order in the Middle East that best suits the interests and will of the peoples of 
the region.  
A few examples from Arab public debates may be enough to demonstrate that 
although the illness of the “Sykes-Picot system” is still a vivid topic in Arab public 
discourse, it has been obscured in the last couple of years by the pessimism regarding the 
US administration’s intentions. These examples point to a perceived analogy between 
“Versailles” and the current sub ect-ob ect relations between outside powers and the Arab 
region. 
 
  e Ara   er e tion of t e   eal of t e Centur   an    ersailles  
The debate about the “Sykes-Picot system” has generally focused on the misplacement 
of the borders within the Middle East and its effect on the permanent redistribution of 
sovereignty and power among the Arab sub ects of the region within the existing state 
system. The “deal of the century” ( a  at al  arn) is perceived to limit the right of “self-
determination” of the Arab peoples in general while also legitimising the “ac uisition of 
land by force.”  
While no one ever  uestioned the legitimacy of debating the raison d  tre of the 
Sykes-Picot borders, few have asserted that the system itself hindered evolution towards 
a  ust regional order. Rather, the right to self-determination was seen as blocked by 
individual states themselves for their own parochial reasons. The “deal of the century,” 
however, will fundamentally change the moral bases of the Israeli-Palestinian peace 
process, and that of Arab-Israeli relations, regardless of whether it remains only an 
abstract concept. 
Arabs living in Palestine at the time viewed the Balfour Declaration as a political 
decision constituting “a gross violation of the principle of self-determination proclaimed 
by the Allies” (Kapitan 199 , 1 ). The plan for the creation of the Jewish State of Israel 
then became reality after World War II and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process reached 
the point where Israel as a territorial entity gained legitimacy (19   borders). Even so, 
the need for Palestinian self-determination remained a starting point of the negotiations. 
If the right of return for Palestinian refugees and the 19   borders would be respected, 
even the radical elements of the Palestinian leadership would perhaps accept a settlement 
of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process (Abu Jahal, 2019). Thus, even if the right for self-




determination of the Palestinian people had been violated throughout the process, partly 
as a result of great power decisions, UN resolutions and acts of the international 
community, a settlement which respects the 19   borders could still, possibly, ensure the 
national self-determination of the Palestinian people. The “deal of the century”, however, 
had been designed to ignore all of the main elements of self-determination and it is thus 
a fundamental violation of this right, exactly in the same way as it was the case with the 
“Versailles” principles. 
The “deal of the century” up until today remains an abstract notion, but in the 
meantime, the Trump administration continuously sets the preconditions for the deal by 
recognizing the sovereignty of the state of Israel over territories beyond the 19   borders. 
As one Arab commentator pointed out, while the world is waiting for the peace plan to 
be published, the US President, his advisors and Israel are working on a radical resolution 
of the conflict. Thus, a growing pessimism surrounds the anticipated plan even without 
the details known (Shatiri, 2019). Moreover, according to Shatiri who is not alone with 
his opinion, the forceful settlement of the conflict, which includes the withdrawal of 
economic support by the US to the Palestinian people refugees, will lead to an un ust deal 
exactly as it was the case with Versailles. It is difficult to imagine how an unfair deal 
would not lead to armed resistance and further rounds of violent conflict.  
 Al-Amir Al-Hassan Bin Talal, the uncle of King Abdullah II, the current ruler of 
Jordan, published an implicit warning in 2019, addressing the great power architects of 
the Middle Eastern regional order about the perils of applying the same ignorance towards 
the territorial sovereignty and the right for national self-determination of the Arab people 
as the architects of the Versailles peace agreement did (Bin Talal, 2019). Bin Talal is 
regarded as a political thinker as he was officially removed from the line of succession in 
Jordan. He rather implicitly noted in his oft-cited piece of opinion that the current state 
of affairs in the Middle East shows a huge similarity to the situation at the time of 
Versailles. As the societies of the Arab states are full of hatred based on ethnic and 
religious conflicts, the “deal of the century” further deteriorates the situation by 
legitimizing the forceful ac uisition of lands and denying the right of self-determination 
to Arabs.  
 The effects of Versailles on Germany and the victors’ perceived responsibility for 
creating the grounds for the political motives of the Nazi regime is another recurring 
element which appears in the Arab public debate along with blaming the victorious 
European powers for the current state of affairs in the Middle East (Abdulrahman Thabit, 




201 ). Ironically, Abdulrahman Thabit notes that the US Congress clearly also saw the 
evil behind the Versailles treaty when they voiced their concerns that “this treaty will not 
provide peace or security, but will open the way to a more terrible war than the one that 
has  ust ended” (i idem), leading it ultimately to re ect the treaty. The writer draws a 
parallel between Versailles and the “deal of the century” as the latter might similarly set 
the stage for building up a more robust resistance against Israel. 
 Although the idea (and right) of “self-determination” and is in any case an 
important basis of the Palestinian “state-building process”, its application or re-
application holds several  uestionable implications. As an Arab commentator pointed out, 
exchanging the established terms of “two-state solution” or “Palestinian state” for “the 
right for self-determination” is clearly a setback in the peace process ( ahya, 201 ). As 
 ahya argues, re-introducing the term of “self-determination” without linking it explicitly 
to Palestinian statehood moves the whole narrative, and the process along with it, back to 
the time of the Versailles peace process.  
 The above examples only serve to highlight that Arab commentators recognized 
and warned that changing the narrative from that of a well-established legal process based 
on international law to a framework of principles and rights is not only a setback in the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process and Israeli-Arab relations but it is also, potentially, a 
very dangerous politically motivated act. The narrative behind the “deal of the century” 
or the forceful execution of an unfair deal, which denies well-established rights, might 
have the same effects in the Middle East of the future as “Versailles” did in post-WWI 
Europe. 
 
Con lusion  As  a  a  eal as  ersailles 
In its report to the Paris Peace Conference on August 2 , 1919, the King-Crane 
Commission expressed the following concern about the future of Palestine if the principle 
of self-determination is the rule applied for the Jewish people (as per the Balfour 
Declaration), while the will of the Arab people is denied: “To sub ect a people so minded 
to unlimited Jewish immigration, and to steady financial and social pressure to surrender 
the land, would be a gross violation of the principle  ust  uoted, and of the people s rights, 
though it kept within the forms of law” ( uoted in: Kapitan, 199 : 1 ).  
The debate on the “deal of the century” clearly illustrates the double-standard 
applied towards Arabs and Israelis. The same double standard was applied after 
Versailles, and during the subse uent foundation of the state of Israel, towards Jews and 




Arabs. While the Jewish immigrants were provided with the right of self-determination, 
this was denied to Palestinians. The shared political and economic vision of the US, Israel 
and implicitly some Arab nations denies a rightful deal to the Palestinian people based on 
the tra ectory set out by the negotiations that have taken place since 19  . By sidelining 
the issue of the return of Palestinian refugees, legitimizing the illegal land ac uisitions 
made by the Jewish state and placing all kinds of political and economic pressure on the 
Palestinian people, the supporters of the “deal of the century” ignore the basic elements 
of the Palestinian right of self-determination. In fact, under the current circumstances, a 
deal of this kind might even set a more far-reaching precedent regarding the right of a 
nation to forcefully ac uire lands from another nation.  
The aim of this analysis was to show some examples from the Arab public debate 
on the analogy between “Versailles” and the “deal of the century” – a parallel drawn with 
reference to the similar double standards manifest in both. In short, the “deal of the 
century” might ultimately be the steal of the century according to the near-unanimous 
view of Arab commentators.   
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